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Abstract
We study a simple scheduling game for the speed scaling model. Players want their
job to complete early, which however generates a big energy consumption. We address the
game from the mechanism design side, and by charging the energy usage to the players
we seek for a good compromize between quality of service and energy usage.
1 Introduction
It is common knowledge that we entered now a period of humanity where natural resources
become rare. This situation triggered consciousness in responsible consumption, and in partic-
ular many countries, companies and individuals aim in minimizing their energy consumption.
Minimizing this resources is a relatively new topic in decision theory, and opened to new
problems and research areas.
Usually minimizing energy consumption is an opposed goal to maximizing quality of ser-
vice, think for example at transport systems. In this paper we consider the particular case
of computing systems with speed scaling. We study a simplified model, with a unique pro-
cessor, that can run at a variable continuous and unbounded speed. Users submit jobs to
this machine, each job has some workload-representing a number of instructions to execute.
Then clearly running these jobs at high speed will be benefic for the users, since it leads to
small job completion time which is the quality of service experienced by the users. On the
other side running at low speed, will be benefic for the machine, which is then more energy
efficient.
In the presence of two opposed goals there is the need to combine them into a single
objective value, which we call the social welfare. For this work we decided to represent the
energy consumption cost and the quality of service as some utility value. The machine is
controlled by a single efficient regulator who maximizes the total social welfare, deciding on
the speed and the order in which jobs are to be scheduled on the machine.
2 General Model
Formally, we consider a non-cooperative game with n users and a regulator. The regulator
manages the machine where the jobs are executed. Each user has a job i with a workload wi
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and a quality of service function Qi. Since the regulator can observe the workload of job i,
once it completes, it makes sense to assume that he knows wi in advance.
The regulator states some cost sharing mechanism C, which is announced publicly. This
mechanism defines a cost share function Ci to be charged to user i, which is supposed to
compensate the energy consumption cost generated by the execution of the workload wi; and
specifies the information {Iˆi} requested by the regulator from user i in order to compute an
optimum schedule s for a specific objective. Note that the announced information Iˆi and the
real information Ii are not necessarily the same.
In this context a schedule is simply defined by two objects: a speed-function s, mapping
every time point to a non-negative speed, as well as an ordering of the jobs. We denote this
order by a permutation σ such that σ(i) is the rank of job i. For convenience, we denote by
π the inverse of σ, i.e. π(j) is the j-th job to scheduled. In the sequel we identify a schedule
by the speed function s and an ordering of the jobs.
The schedule defines a completion time ti for each job i and generates an energy consump-
tion cost defined as E(s) :=
∫ +∞
0 s
α(t)dt, and
∫ tpi(j)
0 s(t)dt =
∑j
k=1wπ(k) for all j, for some
constant α which is usually assumed to be 2 ≤ α ≤ 3.
Finally, the regulator charges a cost share Ci and announces a completion time tˆi for each
user i, which could be different from ti. By normalization we can assume that the welfare
function for the cost share Ci is the identity, i.e. the value of cost share in monetary unit is
the same value in utility unit.
The objective of each user i is to minimize his welfare
Wi := Qi(tˆi)− Ci(s),
whereas the objective of the regulator is to maximize the total welfare.
WT :=
n∑
i=1
Wi.
For a given mechanism, these values depend on the information Iˆ declared by the users, so
we might adopt a function notation for WT .
In this model, the strategy for user i is an information Iˆi that he has to announce. We call
Iˆ ′i as an improvement for the user i if his welfare Wi for the strategy profile (
ˆI−i, Iˆ
′
i) is strictly
larger than for the strategy profile Iˆ = ( ˆI−i, Iˆi). Here ( ˆI−i, Iˆ ′i) stands for the strategy profile
which is identical with Iˆ, except at index i, where the strategy for player i is Iˆ ′i. Player i is
happy in the strategy profile Iˆ if there is no possible improvement for him. A strategy profile
I, where every player is happy, is called a pure Nash equilibrium. As we do not mention mixed
Nash equilibria in this work, we will omit the term pure from now on.
With these definitions in mind, we are facing two related problems:
The Centralized optimization problem where the regulator has an objective to maxi-
mize and the necessary information for computing an optimum is known to him.
The Mechanism design problem where the regulator has an objective to maximize and
the necessary information for its computing is only known to the users. In this situation,
the regulator must design a cost sharing mechanism such that each user will be happy
if he announces his private information as required by the regulator.
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2.1 Desirable properties of cost sharing mechanisms
We have the game theoretical problem of designing a cost sharing mechanism C with the
following desired properties.
1. The mechanism should be budget-balanced, meaning that
∑
i Ci(s) = E(s). If not,
we want at least a β-budget-balanced mechanism for some constant β, meaning that
E(s) ≤∑iCi(s) ≤ βE(s).
2. The mechanism C should always admit a Nash equilibrium. In particular, the mecha-
nism will be strategy proof if the strategy profile, where every user announces his private
information, is a Nash equilibrium.
3. The mechanism C cannot arbitrarily exclude any users; meaning that if user i is willing
to pay enough (at least Ci) then his job is executed.
4. In the mechanism C, every user has the possibility to exclude himself, resulting that his
job won’t be executed, the user won’t be charged and experience an individual welfare
of zero.
2.2 Users
We study two types of users according, depending on their welfare functions for quality of
service, which can either be QAi and Q
B
i as defined below. Both functions are monotone non-
increasing in the completion time of job tˆi, and translating how important it for user i that his
job i completes early. Type A users have some constant utility when the job completes before
some private deadline and zero utility if it completes late. Type B users have some utility
which is linear with the job completion time. So there is a given utility if their job completes
at the ideal time zero, and the utility fades linearly with increasing completion time. The
formal definitions of these qualitity of service functions are given below in equations 1 and 2
for some constants UAi , di, U
B
i , pi > 0.
QAi (tˆi) :=
{
UAi if tˆi ≤ di
0 otherwise
(1)
QBi (tˆi) :=U
B
i − pitˆi (2)
The variants of optimization and mechanism problems are detailed in the next sections.
3 Type A users
In this section we consider the case where all users are of type A. This means that every user
has a quality of service function QAi using a private value U
A
i and private deadline di. The
regulator requests the private deadlines from the users.
3.1 Optimization problem
We consider the centralized optimization problem consisting in the maximization of the total
welfare. Suppose that the regulator knows the deadlines d of all users and the sum of utility
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values
∑
i U
A
i is sufficiently large, such that the maximum total welfare is when all users
participate to the game. By considering a budget balanced mechanism, we have:
Theorem 1. Consider a game with type A users. Assume that total welfare is maximized
when all users participate to the game. The problem of maximizing the total welfare is equiv-
alent to the problem of minimizing the consumed energy cost which can be computed in time
O(n log n).
Minimizing the consumed energy cost has been widely studied, in a more general setting
with release times. The paper [7] provided the first polynomial time algorithm which time
complexity was improved from O(n3) to O(n2 log n) by [3]. This has been improved to O(n2)
if the release time–deadline intervals are laminar, i.e. have a tree structure [2].
In [7] it was observed by an averaging argument that in an optimal schedule s, if job i is
scheduled at speed s(t) at some time t, then in the whole span of the job — which is [0, di) in
our case — the speed must be at least s(t). From this fact follows that in an optimal schedule
the speed function s is non-increasing and even piecewise constant. So we can describe the
schedule by a sequence of pairs of the form (v, ℓ) where v/ℓ stands for a speed, ℓ for the
duration of an interval and v for the workload which can be done in this interval ℓ. We use
this argument in our proof.
Proof. (sketch) Assume that jobs are ordered according to deadlines, i.e. d1 ≤ . . . ≤ dn. By
an exchange argument without loss of generality jobs are scheduled by an optimal schedule in
the same order. This means that in our case a schedule is really defined by the speed function
s. The optimization problem can be formulated as
max
n∑
i=1
Wi = max
n∑
i=1
QAi (s)−E(s) = max
n∑
i=1
UAi − E(s) (3)
s.t ∫ di
0
s(t)dt ≥
i∑
j=1
wj ∀i. (4)
Since
∑n
i=1 U
A
i is constant, the same schedule minimizes E(s) under condition (4). Thus,
the mechanism needs to compute a speed function s minimizing the consumed energy while
respecting all deadlines.
We describe now a linear time algorithm to compute the optimal schedule s, assuming
jobs are already ordered according to deadlines. Let Oi be a stack of pairs in decreasing
order of speed, describing the optimal schedule for job set {1, . . . , i}. We define O0 as the
empty stack. Now Oi is obtained from Oi−1 in the following manner. First we push on Oi−1
the pair (wi, di − di−1). Then while Oi−1 contains at least two pairs, and the two top pair
(v, ℓ) and second top pair (v′, ℓ′) satisfy v′ℓ ≤ vℓ′, we replace them by (v + v′, ℓ + ℓ′). The
invariant is that
∑
(v,ℓ)∈Oi
ℓ = di and the pair (v, ℓ) are in strict decreasing order of
v
ℓ The
proof correctness is omitted.
Thus, our specific problem can be solved in time O(n log n), the necessary time to sort
jobs according to deadlines.
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3.2 Mechanism design problem
We adopt the above assumptions and define that the information requested by the regulator
are the deadlines d of the jobs. This allows him to optimize total welfare. Thus, only if the
information announced by users are the true private values, the regulator is able to optimize
total welfare.
We study the proportional cost sharing mechanism. Its definition is quite easy, every user
is charged exactly the cost generated by the worklaoad of its job. In this mechanism, the
regulator annouces the true job completion times, that is tˆi = ti.
Theorem 2. The game with type A users and the proportional cost sharing mechanism is
strategy proof.
Proof. Being strategy proof means that if each player announces the true individual deadlines,
i.e. dˆi = di then the resulting strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium. Let C
p
i (s) be the cost
share for player i, as defined by the proportional cost sharing mechanism Cp. We define
Cp
π(j)
(s) := (tπ(j) − tπ(j−1))1−αwαπ(j), where for convenience we abuse notation and write
tπ(0) := 0.
We assume that each user π(j) wants to maximize his welfare Wπ(j)(s). The mechanism
satisfies tˆπ(j) = tπ(j) ≤ dˆπ(j). No player knows the information of the other players. We show
that for this situation announcing the true value is a dominant strategy, in the sense that
it leads to a pure Nash equilibrium. The idea is similar to second-price sealed-bid auction.
Table 1 shows the payoff of user π(j) in function his strategy and the regulator’s strategy.
Table 1: Payoff for different strategies in different cases
User’strategy
dˆπ(j) < dπ(j) dˆπ(j) = dπ(j) dˆπ(j) > dπ(j)
R
eg
u
la
to
r’
s
st
ra
te
gy
t π
(j
)
<
dˆ
π
(j
)
(tπ(j) − tπ(j−1))1−αwαπ(j) (tπ(j) − tπ(j−1))1−αwαπ(j)
(tπ(j) − tπ(j−1))1−αwαπ(j)
or 0
t π
(j
)
=
dˆ
π
(j
)
(dˆπ(j) − tπ(j−1))1−αwαπ(j) (dπ(j) − tπ(j−1))1−αwαπ(j) 0
It is easy to see that the strategy dˆπ(j) = dπ(j) is dominant.
In order to measure the proportional cost sharing mechanism, we see that it is budget-
balanced and it does not exclude any users by definition. In addition, if we assume that
each user i has a non negative welfare when his workload is executed and the cost share is
charged, then this mechanism will be efficient. This latter fact implies uniqueness of the Nash
equilibrium which also optimizes total welfare.
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4 Type B users
In this section we consider the game with type B users. Every player i has now a quality
of service function QBi . In this game the regulator needs to receive from the players the
workloads w and deadlines d of the jobs, so he can maximize total welfare.
4.1 Optimization problem
We assume that the regulator knows the penalties p of the jobs and the sum of utility values∑
i U
B
i is sufficiently large, such that the total welfare is maximized when all users participate
in the game. We consider a budget balanced mechanism, and we obtain the following result,
which has been independently obtained by Megow and Verschae [4].
Theorem 3. Consider a game with type B users. Assume that the total welfare is maxi-
mized when all users participate in the game. The problem of maximizing the total welfare is
equivalent to the classical scheduling problem denoted as 1||∑witβi for β := (α− 1)/α.
Proof. Fix some optimal schedule. The jobs complete in some order π, and by the j-th job we
refer to this order. For any j > 1 the j-th job schedules in the interval [tπ(j−1), tπ(j)) wheras
the first job schedules in the interval [0, tπ(1)). Denote by ℓj the length of the execution
interval of the j-th job. From the averaging argument from [7] we know that the jobs are
scheduled throughout their interval at equal speed sj := wπ(j)/ℓj . With these notations the
completion time of the j-th job can be written as
∑j
i=1 ℓi.
Thus, the optimization problem can be formulated as:
max
n∑
i=1
Wi(s) = max
n∑
i=1
QBi (s)− E(s) = max
n∑
i=1
(
UBi − piti
)− E(s). (5)
s.t. ∫ tj
0
s(t)dt ≥
j∑
i=1
wi ∀j. (6)
Again, since
∑n
i=1 U
A
i is constant, the same schedule maximizes the following expression
under condition (6):
min
n∑
i=1
piti + E(s). (7)
And, by definition of s(t), we have:
min
n∑
j=1
wαπ(j)ℓ
1−α
j +
n∑
j=1
pπ(j)
j∑
i=1
ℓi. (8)
The first order condition of this function on the variable ℓj for an arbitrary index j states
(1− α)wαπ(j)ℓ−αj +
n∑
k=j
pπ(k) = 0,
which implies
wαπ(j)ℓ
−α
j =
∑n
k=j pπ(k)
α− 1 .
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Replacing these equalities in the social cost value leads to
n∑
j=1
ℓj
∑nk=j pπ(k)
α− 1 +
n∑
k=j
pπ(k)

=
α
α− 1
n∑
j=1
ℓj
n∑
k=j
pπ(k)
The first order condition on ℓj above gave the equality
ℓj =
(
wαπ(j)(α− 1)∑n
k=j pπ(k)
) 1
α
which permits to simplify as
α
α− 1
n∑
j=1
(
wαπ(j)(α− 1)∑n
k=j pπ(k)
) 1
α n∑
k=j
pπ(k)
=α(α − 1) 1−αα
n∑
j=1
wπ(j)
 n∑
k=j
pπ(k)

α−1
α
.
Now consider the following scheduling problem, which also consists of n jobs, but this
time, the processing time of job i is pi, its priority weight is wi and its completion denoted
by Ci. The aim is to schedule these jobs on a single machine, with unit speed, so to minimize∑
i
wiC
α−1
α
i .
Clearly every optimal schedule to the above problem corresponds to an schedule maxi-
mizing total welfare in the former model, just by reversing the job order. In conclusion, the
optimization problem is polynomial equivalent to a classical scheduling problem denoted as
1||∑wiCβi for β := (α− 1)/α.
The complexity of this problem type remains still open. Concerning approximation al-
gorithms, Stiller and Wiese [6] show that the Smith’s rule [5] guarantees an approximation
factor of (
√
3 + 1)/2 ≈ 1.366 which is tight when f is part of the problem input, whereas
Ho¨hn and Jacobs [1] derive a simple method to compute the tight approximation factor of a
Smith-ratio-schedule for any particular monotone increasing convex or concave cost function.
4.2 Mechanism design problem
From the previous theorem it follows that in order to maximize total welfare, the game
regulator needs to know the individual penalties p of the players. Therefore we aim for a
thruthful cost sharing mechanism. To fix the notations, we call X the mechanism proposed
in this section, and assume that the game regulator announces completion times tˆi which are
the true completion times ti of the schedule produced by the regulator.
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We define now the cost sharing mechanism X, where Cxi (s) is the cost share for player
i. The mechanism computes the schedule that maximizes total welfare. By the j-th job, we
refer to the order in which jobs complete therein. We define the cost share for the j-th player
π(j) as follows:
Cxπ(j)(s) :=
j∑
k=1
(
αsαk − pˆπ(j)
)
ℓk
where
sαk =
∑n
r=k pˆr
α− 1 =
wαk
ℓαk
.
Note that Cxπ(j)(s) is equivalent to:
(α− 1)−1
j∑
k=1
pˆj + α n∑
r=k,r 6=j
pˆr
 ℓk
where
ℓk =
(
wk
∑n
r=k pˆr
α− 1
)−1/α
.
Hence, the cost share for the first player in the sequence is the penalty weighted execution
time over all other jobs plus its energy cost.
Theorem 4. The game with type B players that the cost sharing mechanism X is strate-
gyproof.
Proof. Consider the definition of Cxi (s). We assume that each player π(j) want to maximize
his welfare Wπ(j)(s). We show that PNE is obtained as an local minimum of Wπ(j)(s). By
definition, he have that the player i has a welfare is
UBi − pi ∗ ti − (α− 1)−1
σ(i)∑
k=1
(p̂i + α
n∑
r=k,r 6=σ(i)
p̂r)ℓk
We now analyze when a changing unilateral of strategy pˆi does’t improve the welfare. We
consider the first derive of welfare function.
∂Wi
∂p̂i
= 0
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Thus, we have:
0 = pi
σ(i)∑
k=1
δℓk
δp̂i
+
σ(i)∑
k=1
(α
δsαk
δp̂i
− 1)ℓk + (αsαk − p̂i)
δℓk
δp̂i
σ(i)∑
k=1
(pi − p̂i)δℓk
δp̂i
+
σ(i)∑
k=1
α
δsαk
δp̂i
ℓk − ℓk + αsαk
ℓk
(1− α)αsαk
σ(i)∑
k=1
(pi − p̂i)δℓk
δp̂i
+
σ(i)∑
k=1
α
δsαk
δp̂i
ℓk − ℓk + αℓk
(1− α)α
σ(i)∑
k=1
(pi − p̂i)δℓk
δp̂i
+
σ(i)∑
k=1
α
α− 1ℓk − ℓk −
ℓk
α− 1
σ(i)∑
k=1
(pi − p̂i)δℓk
δp̂i
+
σ(i)∑
k=1
ℓk
α− α+ 1− 1
α− 1
σ(i)∑
k=1
(pi − p̂i)δℓk
δp̂i
Given that δℓkδp̂i 6= 0, then p̂i must be pi.
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